For 75 years, South Korea has been preparing for a Second Korean War. An apocalyptic conflict where hordes of North Korean infantry and tanks storm across the Demilitarized Zone, covered by massive artillery and rocket barrages.

But what if South Korea is preparing to fight the last war – while North Korea is preparing to fight the next one?

North Korea is studying the lessons of the Ukraine War. Not just theoretically, but backed by first-hand experience from 15,000 North Korean soldiers – mainly elite special forces units – who fought for Russia in Ukraine.

One of those lessons will certainly be the vulnerability of armored vehicles to drones. And that’s bad news for South Korea, whose army relies heavily on tanks.

“KPA [Korean People’s Army] units have adapted and adjusted to the new style of warfare in Ukraine,” warned a recent analysis by the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

North Korea is moving away from the Soviet- and Chinese-style tactics from the Cold War, which relied on massed troops, tanks and artillery to blast and bulldoze their way through enemy defenses. Instead, it is moving toward small-unit operations that have become the norm in Ukraine.

“The KPA’s foundational emphasis on offensive maneuver and asymmetric capabilities remains intact – but it is now scaffolded onto low-signature, networked, small-unit operations that differ from the mass maneuver tactics absorbed from Chinese in the Korean War,” said the RUSI report.

Ironically, the face of warfare is changing just as South Korea has built some of the most impressive tank forces in the world. The Republic of Korea Army has more than 2,100 tanks and 3,300 armored troop carriers (by comparison, Britain has around 200 tanks and 1,300 armored troop carriers). Indeed, South Korea has become a major armored vehicle exporter, with its K2 tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers used by customers ranging from Poland to Vietnam.

Though the mountainous Korean peninsula isn’t ideal tank country, tanks proved useful in the Korean War as mobile artillery and bunker-busters. South Korea’s prime main battle tank – the Hyundai K2 Black Panther – has a special suspension system for operating in hilly terrain.

Today, South Korea “relies heavily on armored maneuver in order to deter and counter a North Korean offensive,” wrote Ju Hyung Kim, president of the Security Management Institute, a South Korean think tank.

Advanced tanks such as the K2 “constitute the core of South Korea’s forward-deployed armored defense north of Seoul. Mechanized divisions and armored brigades are designed to deter North Korea’s advancement in historically important locations, including Kaesong, Cheorwon, and the western corridor toward the Han River, and to execute a rapid counteroffensive maneuver.”

That’s classic doctrine for mechanized warfare since World War II. Yet there were similar expectations of mobile warfare when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Four years later, drones have reduced armored vehicles to playing a minor role at best. Vehicles stay mostly under cover for fear of detection and destruction from omnipresent UAVs. Fitted with anti-drone cages, tanks now resemble porcupines or mobile chicken coops.

Ju Hyung Kim fears that drones – controlled by North Korea’s 200,000 special operations commandos – could devastate South Korean armor as well as U.S. mechanized forces stationed in Korea. “Tank units that execute counterattacks would encounter constant surveillance, especially in altitude bands below 1,000 meters where traditional air defenses are thinnest. Logistics convoys necessary to sustain armored counteroffensive would become objects of tracking and strike operations.”

Like the U.S. Army that it’s modeled on, the Republic of Korea Army has been accustomed to friendly skies. North Korea’s aging air force is no match for South Korea’s air force, especially when backed by U.S. airpower. Why invest in mobile anti-aircraft missiles and cannon when armored units can operate under fighter cover? Better to focus on North Korea’s 3,500 tanks and 22,000 artillery pieces.

But as demonstrated in Ukraine and more recently in the Persian Gulf, high-altitude jet fighters are not meant to stop swarms of low-altitude drones. Intercepting $20,000 Iranian Shahed UAVs with $4 million Patriot missiles is not just economically ruinous, but will exhaust missile stockpiles long before the attacker run out of drones.

At the least, South Korea will have to beef up its air defenses with affordable, mobile counter-drone systems such as lasers and microwave weapons, as well as jammers. Tanks are most effective when they are concentrated, but on a drone-saturated battlefield, they may have to operate dispersed.

However, this doesn’t mean that tanks are doomed to extinction in Korea. One reason why drones have become so overwhelming in the Ukraine War is their sheer numbers. Ukraine alone manufactures 4 million drones per year, a feat made possible by the country’s large number of tech innovators. With an economy that’s around one-fifteenth the size of Ukraine, North Korea would find it difficult to build such quantities even with Russian and Chinese help.

The Korean DMZ is about 160 miles long, or about the one-fifth the length of the frontline in Ukraine, with just a few invasion corridors traversing the rugged terrain. This would let South Korean and American forces concentrate anti-drone defenses, including new weapons such as lasers, microwave emitters, jammers and small interceptor drones.

Perhaps the biggest question is whether drone warfare would actually favor North Korea. What’s striking about the Ukraine War is just how indecisive drone warfare is. Despite launching drones by the millions, Russia has not conquered Ukraine, and Ukraine has not ejected Russia from its soil.

Instead, the conflict has become a stalemate, an endless war of attrition characterized by small units conducting small operations to capture small amounts of ground at heavy cost. On a battlefield where omnipresent drones make maneuver impossible, then the chance for decisive victory is lost.

With a far smaller economy and half the population of the South, the North does not want to fight a long war. Drones may be the future, but they don’t guarantee victory.

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Beware of Pentagon agencies bearing gifts. Inside that innocent-looking shipping container could be hundreds of attack and reconnaissance drones, ready to emerge like a swarm of robotic bees.

When those drones complete their mission, they will return to the container to refuel and rearm, and then fly out again...and again...over several days. And all of this will be automated, with no humans present.

Or, at least that’s the vision of the technologists at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Pentagon’s research arm. DARPA wants autonomous containers that can launch, recover, supply and then relaunch “constellations” – or swarms – of up to 500 drones.

Drone swarms are emerging as one of the deadliest weapons in the 21st Century. Hordes of quadcopters – coordinated by AI to strike from multiple directions simultaneously – threaten to overwhelm tanks, artillery, ships and other traditional weapons.

Indeed, DARPA outlines an intriguing – if slightly frightening – scenario in its Request for Information, which is intended to solicit ideas from industry. The scenario involves a remote-controlled container that – when activated -- “autonomously deploys a series of platforms [drones] launching from a single area (possibly serially). The platforms traverse some radius away, loiter on-station with an active payload (not all necessarily in the same location nor same payloads), and execute a mission before returning back to the launch area, autonomously recovering, recharging/refueling, and launching again to repeat the mission (without human intervention).”

The idea of drones-in-a-box isn’t new. Most famous is Ukraine’s “Operation Spider’s Web” in June 2025, in which drones were hidden aboard cargo trucks that snuck into Russia over 18 months. The drones were launched in a surprise strike that destroyed or damaged as many as 40 Russian aircraft, including precious Tu-22 and Tu-95 strategic bombers. Perhaps more significant was that containerized drones enable Ukraine to strike Russian airbases 3,000 miles away in Siberia, far beyond effective strike range of UAVs launched from Ukrainian territory.

Naturally, with its vastly bigger defense budget and resources, America wants to go one step further. The Pentagon essentially wants to create portable drone bases that can be dropped in remote locations and function without humans on site.

This raises all sorts of possibilities. For example, drone-filled shipping containers could be covertly left near sensitive installations such as ICBM sites, airbases, defense factories, and military and political headquarters.

Indeed, in February, the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit released a proposal for a Containerized Autonomous Drone Delivery System. CADDS is intended to “exist in a dormant state for a period of time and launch UAS upon command.”

Perhaps not coincidentally, the DARPA and DIU projects come after Chinese company DAMODA unveiled a shipping container packed with 648 drones. DAMODA also wowed observers with a record-breaking 15,947 drones that performed a coordinated lightshow in the skies over Chongqing.

DARPA is less impressed with that feat. “While sufficient for preplanned lightshows and commercial activities, further advancements are required to exploit constellation technologies in a high platform density and rapid deployment scenario,” the RFI reminded readers.

For example, DARPA wants drone containers that can function where GPS isn’t available. This would allow operations where GPS is jammed, or deployment in mountainous or other rugged locations where GPS coverage may not be available.

Either way, DARPA believes current storage containers can’t do the job because they require humans to handle launch and maintenance. They also don’t have the right internal configuration to accommodate equipment for communications and recharging.

DARPA isn’t fixed on using standard containers such as Conex and ISU. “Innovative ideas and non-standard containers (e.g. suitcase-based distributed systems, box-based systems) will also be considered within the context of the presented approach, but solutions should be compatible with current military transport capabilities,” the RFI said.

In addition to a new launch container, DARPA wants a new kind of drone. The agency is not satisfied with the container-launched drones now offered by multiple companies. Current electric-powered UAVs have limited battery power, while hybrid-electric propulsion is heavier and more complicated, according to the agency. “While some constellation delivery solutions can unleash hundreds of drones in under a minute, these platforms often lack the ability to integrate external payloads, with their additional SWaP [size, weight and power], that enable meaningful effects/surveillance,” DARPA said.

Instead, DARPA is looking at new kinds of small- to medium-sized drones in Groups 1 to 3 (0 to 1,300 pounds gross takeoff weight). While the RFI doesn’t mention quadcopters, it does note that fixed-wing designs are too large for containers and can’t hover.

Whatever drone design is chosen, it should function at Autonomy Level 4, which means a human operator merely assigns a mission, and the drone handles the rest. They will be launched and relaunched from containers that can sustain drone swarm operations over several days. The system would include AI that would handle functions such as coordinating the various drones, avoiding collisions, and optimizing flight paths.

With containerized drones already a reality, the question is how far humans will extend the concept. A future where every box --whether parked in a field or on a street -- has to be treated as a potential threat, is a grim one.

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The last time that China and America fought a major ground battle was in the Korean War, almost 75 years ago.

But that Chinese army of poorly equipped peasants – who still came perilously close to ejecting U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula – are long gone. If U.S. troops were to fight the People’s Liberation Army of today, they would encounter a foe that is far more technologically and tactically sophisticated than in 1950.

The PLA’s evolution can be seen in a scenario recently tested by U.S. Army experts: what would happen if a Chinese Heavy Combined Arms Brigade (HCAB) fought a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT)? These are roughly equivalent units of about 5,000 soldiers each.

The answer is that the Chinese brigade would use tanks, drones, artillery, missiles, electronic warfare, and aggressive tactics to disrupt and destroy its American counterpart, according to an analysis by the U.S. Army’s Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).

In other words, the Chinese Army would mirror the same approach that the U.S. Army uses. Conduct a joint battle in which a variety of forces would combine to first paralyze the U.S. brigade, and then encircle and destroy the confused and helpless American troops.

When A Chinese Brigade Attacks an American Brigade

Chinese doctrine calls for prepping the battlefield a week before the Chinese heavy brigade begins its attack. Special forces teams would infiltrate American lines and launch small drones to locate the defender’s positions, while artillery, missiles and commandos would strike U.S. supply dumps, command posts and artillery positions.

H-Hour would kick off the actual ground assault, which would attempt to destroy the U.S. brigade within 24 hours. The attack would commence with a feint of two or three heavy combined arms battalions, with 30 to 50 Type 96 main battle tanks and Type 04A troop carriers, and supported by 120-mm mortars, kamikaze drones, air defense weapons, and attack helicopters. This force would seek to divert American attention from the real point of attack.

By H + 8, if all goes according to plan, U.S. troops will be pinned down, their artillery suppressed, communications disrupted, and drones neutralized. That’s when the main attack force begins its assault.

Tanks and troop carriers will advance, preceded by combat engineers, minefield breaching vehicles and mobile bridging systems to deal with obstacles. Assault troops would be screened by smoke and supported by intensive bombardment.

If a breakthrough is achieved, then comes the coup de grace. By H + 20 hours, the Chinese brigade would have advanced deep into American defenses, overrunning support units and isolating and mopping up the defender. Then Chinese forces will dig in to withstand any U.S. counterattack.

When A U.S. Brigade Attacks a Chinese Brigade

On the defense, a Chinese Heavy Combined Arms Brigade would rely on artillery, drones and aggressive counterattacks to repel an assault by a U.S. brigade. “A U.S. Army BCT attacking a PLA Army HCAB would encounter an active, elastic, and deep system designed to lure, attrit, and ambush an attacking force before destroying it with a decisive counterstrike,” said the T2COM study.

As U.S. troops approached to within 13 to 20 kilometers (7 to 12 miles) of Chinese lines, they would be tracked by Chinese special forces teams with small drones, and harassed by artillery fire and ambushes. As they entered the outer Chinese defensive zone – about 3 to 5 kilometers (2 to 3 miles) from the main defensive belt – they would encounter “complex obstacles, antitank and antipersonnel minefields, trenches, mutually supporting positions, and strongpoints” intended to funnel the attacker into kill zones.

But this would only be a prelude to the meatgrinder as the attacker comes under heavy fire from the main Chinese defensive zone, which would be supported by artillery, drones, and attack helicopters. American fire would be hampered by decoy targets such as inflatable tanks, and thermal blankets to frustrate heat sensors.

With the attackers worn down and off balance, then will come the counterattack by one or two battalions to eject them from Chinese positions. Or if the American attack is successful, the Chinese brigade will conduct an orderly retreat screened by rearguard units.

Will Chinese combat tactics work?

All military doctrine sounds good on paper. Russian doctrine in 2022 suggested the Russian military had been transformed into an agile, modern 21st Century force. Instead, the force that invaded Ukraine resembled the clumsy, rigid armies of World War II and the Cold War.

Nonetheless, what’s significant is that Chinese doctrine doesn’t sound like that of a nation that feels militarily inferior to America. China went to war in 1950 knowing that it would have to use mass, maneuver and surprise to compensate for superior American firepower.

Today’s Chinese doctrine suggests self-confidence that Chinese troops can defeat America in straightforward combined arms warfare. As in the Korean War, Chinese forces would also exploit what it sees as U.S. weaknesses, particularly American reliance on elaborate command and communications systems.

After two decades of focusing on small-unit counterinsurgency, there are legitimate questions today about the U.S. Army’s ability to conduct major combat operations. The last time the U.S. Army faced a serious opponent in mechanized warfare was against Hitler’s panzer divisions at the Battle of the Bulge in 1944.

On the other hand, China hasn’t fought any war since it conducted a small, brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Nor does it have any history of conducting large-scale mechanized operations. The 3 million PLA “volunteers” who fought in Korea were mainly foot soldiers. Today’s Chinese military is plagued by corruption and constant purges of senior officers.

Whether the PLA’s battle plan would be effective remains to be seen. But either way, American troops would face a new kind of Chinese foe.

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The art of strategy is pitting your strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. Make them play your game rather than you playing theirs.

Which is why sending U.S. troops to seize Iranian territory is a bad idea. It would throw away America’s advantages in technology and resources, while allowing Iran’s rulers to fight the war on their terms.

The disappointment felt by the Trump administration is understandable. Despite five weeks of intensive U.S. and Israeli bombing, Tehran still won’t make peace on terms acceptable to Washington.

Wars tend to escalate not because of strategy, but because of frustration. If airstrikes don’t compel the enemy to surrender, then the next rung on the ladder of violence is to put boots on the ground.

At the least, it might serve as leverage in negotiations, and signal your determination to win the war – or so the theory goes. Similar thinking led the U.S. to move from providing advisers and air support to South Vietnam, to ultimately committing more than 3 million troops.

Whether Trump is serious or bluffing about a ground war remains to be seen. He predicts the war will end in a few weeks. But he has also spoken of seizing Kharg Island – through which most of Iran’s oil is exported – and has sent 3,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division as two battalion-sized Marine Expeditionary Units to the Persian Gulf.

If the U.S. is going to escalate from airpower to boots on the ground, than the question is what a ground war would accomplish that the air war can’t. Iran has already lost much of its senior political and military leadership, as well as many of its missile launchers, weapons factories, warships, and nuclear sites.

If aerial bombardment – as well as decades of sanctions that have devastated Iran’s economy – won’t sway the Iranian regime, will a few thousand troops really make a difference?

As critics –myself included – have argued bombing alone is unlikely to compel Iran into “unconditional surrender,” as Trump initially demanded. But what bombing can do is leverage America’s strengths against Iranian weaknesses.

The fact is that the U.S. and Israeli air forces can bomb Iran at will. The U.S. has struck over 8,000 targets, and Israel has dropped over 16,000 bombs and missiles. With their air defenses smashed, Iran’s rulers become like Snoopy shaking his fist at the Red Baron.

What is also remarkable is that no American or Israeli aircraft have been shot down. No captured pilots paraded before Iranian television cameras or forced to “confess” to war crimes.

Just a handful of planes have been lost due to collisions, a “friendly” but trigger-happy Kuwaiti pilot, and Iranian drone strikes on airbases. Embarrassing as these losses are, they are nothing compared to the 8,000 bombers and 26,000 aircrew lost in the bombing campaign against Germany in World War II. Or the more than 900 aircraft and 1,000 aircrew lost over North Vietnam during Operation Rolling Thunder.

But a ground war would be far bloodier. Compared to being helplessly pounded from the air, the Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would love nothing more than to fight the U.S. on the ground.

If the U.S. seizes Kharg Island, American troops would be just 25 miles from the Iranian mainland. They would be vulnerable to IEDs, rockets, drones, long-range artillery, snipers, and commando raids. The garrison would need to be resupplied, reinforced and rotated, which would require a constant stream of cargo vessels and aircraft that would be at risk from Iranian mines and aircraft.

This isn’t to blow the trumpet for an air war. Bombing hasn’t defeated Iran, nor was it ever likely to. But airpower does play to America’s advantages in technology and resources. A ground war of attrition plays to Iran’s advantage, which is the regime’s total indifference to how many of its own soldiers are “martyred” in the fight against “the Great Satan.”

Ultimately, the issue isn’t whether bombs or boots are better. It’s that there is no good military option to deal with an Iranian regime that has declared war on its own people. A government that would cheerfully massacre 30,000 protestors rather than give up the right to build ballistic missiles, stockpile weapons-grade uranium, and support proxies that terrorize the Middle East.

If there is no perfect strategy, than the best option is the least costly one. Aircraft are expensive, but they are fast, flexible, and don’t have targets waiting to be picked off on Iran’s doorstep.

An air campaign may not win the war. But it is much less costly – financially or politically – as putting American boots on the ground.

The U.S. and Israel could run out of some types of missiles by next month, according to a new report.

This list includes Patriot air defense missiles, Israeli Arrow missile interceptors, U.S. ATACMS and PrSM ballistic missiles, as well as propellant and explosives, warned the analysis published by the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

The U.S. and its allies launched more than 11,000 missiles and smart bombs in 16 days, a rate of expenditure that cannot be sustained. “While American and Israeli forces achieve some tactical success by striking thousands of targets, the wider coalition is also downing drones and intercepting missiles by expending multi-million-dollar missiles that cost a fraction of the price,” said the report, which used data compiled by the Payne Institute – a U.S.-based public policy research organization – to examine inventories as well as manufacturing and supply chains.

Ultimately, “battlefield dominance matters less than the industrial capacity to replenish critical stockpiles,” the report said.

Concerns over insufficient numbers of expensive guided munitions aren’t new. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, supplying offensive and defensive missiles to Ukraine has depleted NATO arsenals.

That the Iran War is exacerbating this problem is already well known. But what is shocking is how many weapons inventories are close to exhaustion. The RUSI report predicted depletion dates for 34 weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles, air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles, GPS-guided bombs, and air defense weapons.

For example, at the present rate of consumption, Israel’s Arrow 2 and 3 interceptors will be gone by the end of March. Patriot and THAAD missile interceptors will be depleted in April, as well as U.S. ATACMS and PrSM ballistic missiles, and Israeli Rampage, Delilah and Popeye Turbo strike missiles.

In May through August, there could be shortfalls of U.S. SM and Israeli Tamir Iron Dome interceptors, Tomahawk cruise missiles and Israel’s inventory of JDAM smart bombs, as well as French MICA air-to-air missiles and Qatar’s Aster air defense rockets. On the other hand, U.S. stockpiles of JDAMs, HIMARS rockets and AIM-120 and AIM-9X appear to be sufficient for several years.

The obvious solution is simply to produce more missiles. During World War II, the combatants were able to mobilize their economies to churn out staggering amounts of weapons, including 300,000 tanks and 800,000 aircraft, with America producing alone producing 300,000 planes.

But ramping up production of guided missiles, many of which require special electronics and raw materials, is another matter. In the first six days of the Iran War, the U.S. fired 319 Tomahawks, according to an estimate by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a U.S. think tank. Yet America only produces about 100 Tomahawks per year, though there are plans to increase that rate to 1,000 per year.

However, that’s easier said than done, given that guided weapons often need specialized components and raw materials. Many of these come from China, which is not inclined to help the West rebuild its arsenal.

“While the defense industrial base is producing most of these munitions at present, they are incredibly complex and difficult to surge, meaning it will likely take at least 5 years to replenish the 500-plus Tomahawk missiles already fired in the war,” the RUSI report noted. “Worse, sourcing critical defense minerals, rare earths, and materials to make the weapons and munitions is complicated by China.”

It’s not just missiles that are in short supply. Air defense cannon, such as the U.S. C-RAM Gatling gun, are cheaper and simpler than missiles, but they also consume vast quantities of raw materials. “The cheap-defeat layer alone consumed almost 29,000 kilograms of propellant and over 10,000 kilograms of explosives,” said the report. The result is that “C-RAM ammunition is competing upstream with Tomahawk, JASSM, and Patriot for the same energetic base. The acquisition system separates missiles from ammunition, but the supply chain does not.”

This has implications far beyond the Iran War. If the U.S. and its allies lack sufficient munitions to fight Iran for more than a few weeks, they won’t have enough to simultaneously supply Ukraine, deter China from invading Taiwan, and replenish their own armed forces.

“In a salvo-based environment, where ‘missile math’ governs the intensity of warfighting, the decisive advantage shifts to the actor that can sustain its defensive economy and replenish its most critical assets,” the report concluded. “Operation Epic Fury is the first test of this new reality, and its initial results are a stark warning.”

If so, then this points to a future where nations must maintain huge inventories of missiles, and have the capacity to rapidly manufacture more. This will put a premium on cheaper weapons designed for mass production.

Yet this also suggests that future conflicts will be battles of attrition waged between rival fleets of offensive and defensive missiles, in a rocket-propelled equivalent of trench warfare. This won’t make war less likely¾but it will make it grimmer.

Call it payback, or call it bad karma. But after supplying Russia with drones that have pounded Ukraine, Iran is about to reap the consequences.

Ukraine is offering its technology and experience in anti-drone warfare to the U.S. and other nations that are under attack by Iranian UAVs. Ukrainian innovation, combined with the immense military and financial resources of the United States, Europe and the Persian Gulf states, could neutralize one of Iran’s most potent weapons.

The U.S. and its allies are struggling to stop the 2,000 or so drones that Iran has launched since the U.S. and Israeli bombing campaign began February 28. For lack of cheap counter-drone systems, they have been forced to use expensive guided missiles – such as $4 million Patriot interceptors – against $20,000 Iranian Shahed drones.

Hence the appeal for Ukrainian help. “We received a request from the United States for specific support in protection against ‘shaheds’ in the Middle East region,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tweeted last week. “I gave instructions to provide the necessary means and ensure the presence of Ukrainian specialists who can guarantee the required security.”

In fact, Ukraine has already sent counter-drone interceptors and personnel to defend U.S. bases in Jordan, Zelensky told the New York Times. Eleven countries have asked for help, and Ukrainian teams are also in Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Zelensky has said.

Whether Ukraine has the resources and time to make a difference in the current Iran War is questionable. Nonetheless, Ukraine is the most innovative nation in the world when it comes to both attacking with – and defending against – drones. That expertise is the bitter fruit of confronting an armada of Russian drones, in which Iran has played a large part.

The Shahed 136 drones that Iran exported to Russia did not bring Moscow victory. But they did enable Russia to continue the war.

By late 2022, Putin’s dream of a blitzkrieg victory over Ukraine had collapsed. Russia’s incompetent armies were stalled on the ground. Nor did Russia have enough ballistic and cruise missiles to continuously bombard Ukraine, especially with international sanctions limiting the import of electronic components for smart munitions.

To Putin’s rescue came Iran, with Shahed drones that cost as little as $20,000 apiece and carry a 100-pound warhead. The Shaheds allowed Russia to conduct a bargain-basement bombardment of Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Around 57,000 Shaheds have been launched at Ukraine, including Russia’s Geran-2 copy, which is built in Tatarstan.

Ukraine got creative because it had no choice. Military aid from Europe and America – especially under Trump – has been uncertain, and Ukraine’s allies lack the capacity to manufacture large numbers of air defense missiles. Thus Ukraine has fielded an ingenious array of counter-drone, or C-UAS, systems, cobbled together with everything from cell phones to old machine guns. For example, the Sky Fortress system covers Ukraine with 14,000 acoustic sensors to detect the sound of Russian drone engines, including the noisy Shahed. There are also mobile air defense teams with .50-caliber machine guns, cargo planes armed with gatling guns, and nets erected over roads to keep out marauding drones.

The best defense is proving to be Ukrainian drones that intercept other drones. More than 70 percent of Shaheds attacking the Kyiv region in February were downed by using interceptor drones, according to the Ukrainian military.

Ukraine has many reasons for aiding the U.S. and other nations against Iran. Trying to get Trump to support Ukraine as a moral obligation, or a necessary counter against Russian expansionism, is futile with a U.S. president who thinks in transactional terms.

But showing that Ukraine is a useful ally to America in time of war may go a long way toward securing U.S. support. Zelensky has already suggested trading Ukraine’s counter-drone assistance in return for more air defense missiles to stop Russian attacks.

Ukraine also needs money to sustain huge defense budgets that would still be necessary even if Russia agreed to end the war. Much like Israel, which has leveraged its combat-proven weapons to become the seventh-largest arms exporter in the world, Ukraine will certainly export its counter-drone technology and experience. In particular, rich Persian Gulf nations will be eager to beef up their defenses after suffering Iranian drone strikes on their cities and oil fields.

Finally, there may also be an element of deterrence here. There is little that Ukraine can do to Iran in terms of military or economic hurt. Kyiv is 1,500 miles from Tehran, and while Ukrainian drones have attacked 1,100 miles away in Russia, Ukraine has its hands full just fighting Russia.

However, helping Iran’s adversaries shoot down Iranian drones sends a signal. Next time Russia asks for weapons, Iran should just say no.

From sticks and stones to tanks and drones, the art of war changes over time.

Case in point: the Battle of the Somme. On July 1, 1916, British commanders hurled masses of infantry – advancing shoulder-to-shoulder – against German machine guns, barbed wire and artillery. The cost was nearly 60,000 British casualties in a single day. The gain was just three square miles of territory captured.

Seared by that experience and determined not to repeat it, armies invented the tank and the airplane to break the trench deadlock. To any Western nation today, the idea of sending soldiers into a meatgrinder like the Somme would be unthinkable.

Yet almost 120 years after a battle that has become a symbol of military stupidity, Russia isn’t just repeating the mistakes of the Somme. It’s actually setting the art of war backwards.

During the five-month Somme campaign, the British only managed to advance an average of 87 yards per day. During Russia’s 18-month effort to capture the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, Russian troops have only advanced an average of 77 yards per day, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

“This is slower than the most brutal offensive campaigns over the last cen­tury, including the notoriously bloody Battle of the Somme during World War I,” CSIS noted.

Comparisons with other historical battles are even less flattering to Russia. At the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, where the Germans had to breach elaborate Soviet defenses that included a million land mines, the daily rate of advance was 3,600 yards, CSIS said. Most embarrassing, Ukraine’s counteroffensive at Kharkiv in September 2022 advanced an average of 8,100 yards per day.

Despite intense bombardment by drones, artillery and glide bombs, Russia hasn’t even managed to capture all of Pokrovsk. It has succeeded in taking 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, or about 46,000 square miles.

The price has been an estimated 1.2 million casualties between February 2022 and December 2025, including 325,000 killed. That doesn’t look so bad compared to the 7 million casualties suffered by Imperial Russia in World War I, or the approximately 11 million military casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II.

But again, the comparisons are damning. The Tsar’s army went to war in 1914 without enough rifles or food, while the Red Army had to contend with Hitler’s lethally efficient war machine. On paper at least, Russia should have defeated Ukraine.

To some extent, Russia’s poor battlefield performance can be blamed on the advent of drone warfare. Masses of drones so dominate the Ukraine war that tanks have been largely chased off the battlefield, and infantry stays in trenches and bunkers for fear of being picked off by explosive-laded quadcopters. Maneuver warfare becomes impossible, and without maneuver, there can only be a war of attrition.

Yet in many ways, the armies at the Somme faced the same situation. The image of First World War generals as being stupid, callous and unimaginative isn’t without merit, but neither is it totally fair. Nations went to war in 1914 expecting a Napoleonic-style war of sweeping maneuvers and glorious victories. Instead, they soon confronted elaborate defensive systems of trenches, machine guns, artillery and barbed wire. What was lacking was a means to crack them.

At first, commanders like Britain’s General Douglas Haig tried to blast their way into a breakthrough. Before the Somme offensive, the British hammered German positions with a week-long bombardment that used up nearly 2 million shells. At the Battle of Verdun in 1916, the German plan was to mass 1,200 guns in an attempt to seize the city, and then bleed the French Army dry when it counterattacked. The cost was more than a million Allied and German casualties at the Somme, and almost as many at Verdun. Despite the carnage, the frontlines had barely moved.

But change eventually came. Within four years after World War I began, both sides had devised ways to break the trench stalemate. Lacking the industrial resources of the Allies, the Germans created highly trained stosstruppen (“storm trooper”) units to infiltrate and encircle Allied defenses. In 1918, these tactics came close to defeating the Allied armies and winning the war.

For their part, the Allies chose mechanization: tanks that could cross bullet-swept No Man’s Land, pulverize German barbed wire and machine gun nests, and let the “poor bloody infantry” seize ground at acceptable cost. These tactics devastated the German Army and compelled Berlin to seek an armistice by November 1918.

It is now four years since Russia invaded Ukraine. It would be incorrect to say that Russia hasn’t innovated. But those innovations seem to belong to a different, almost pre-mechanized era. With most of its prewar arsenal of 14,000 armored vehicles destroyed, Russian tactics now rely on infantry backed by massive numbers of drones and other firepower.

Assaults are made by small teams of poorly trained and equipped infantry. Some are convicts freed from prison in return for fighting; others attack while riding unarmored motorcycles. These suicide troops advance until they are shot by Ukrainian troops, who thus reveal their position to Russian drones and artillery.

It’s not that these tactics are ineffective. Ukraine’s army is being worn down. But Russia is being worn down as well, including by an economy that is beginning to crack under the strain.

The question is whether the attritional warfare of Ukraine is an inevitable byproduct of 21st Century weapons such as drones. Perhaps new technology, such as lasers mounted on tanks, may at least partly mitigate the drone threat.

But the lesson of the Somme is that mindsets have to change as well. Russian losses in Ukraine can’t just be blamed on drones. Russian generals – and their leaders, such as Putin – don’t care about the lives of their soldiers. That is something the veterans of the Somme would understand.

Will Ukrainians see the light? Under skies darkened by hordes of Russian drones, Ukrainians can hope for salvation could come in the form of lasers and microwave weapons. Neutralize the armada of UAVs that are pummeling Ukrainian troops and cities – and Russia’s plodding ground offensive falls apart.

But that vision is not yet practical. The problem is that directed energy weapons (DEW) have not yet matured to the point that they are a reliable defense against unmanned aircraft, according to a new report. If so, this has implications not just for Ukraine, but also for other nations turning to energy weapons.

“DEWs should not be a near-term investment focus for Ukraine,” warns a report by the RAND Corp. think tank. “Whilst DEWs are an appealing technological pursuit which can affect multiple targets at once and reduce reliance on munitions, these systems present significant practical limitations for Ukraine.”

“Current Ukrainian defense needs would be better served by other capabilities that can more immediately provide affordable mass,” RAND said.

This assessment may come as a surprise, given all the buzz about energy weapons for counter-UAS (C-UAS) defense. Several nations are pursuing high-energy lasers (aptly named HEL) and microwave weapons. Israel has just announced deployment of its Iron Beam, Britain plans to arm warships with the DragonFire laser, and China unveiled a mobile laser during a military parade in September (Ukrainian media claims that Russia is already using China’s Silent Hunter laser in Ukraine).

The U.S. has multiple DEW projects, including a 20-kilowatt truck-mounted laser, while the Marine Corps is developing mobile high-power microwave (HPM) weapons. Even Ukraine itself has developed and tested the Tryzub laser.

If drones are the future of warfare, then the attraction of energy weapons is obvious. They can zap drones – and rockets and artillery shells -- at a fraction of the cost of traditional air defense missiles and guns. Launching a million-dollar missile at a thousand-dollar drone is a losing proposition, especially for Ukraine, which is already desperately short of air defense munitions such as PAC-3 Patriot missiles. Even if the money were available, the manufacturing is not: with Russia producing an estimated 5,400 drones per month, Ukraine and its allies couldn’t churn out enough conventional air defense weapons to keep up.

In contrast, lasers may cost as little as $1 per shot, and they won’t run out of ammunition as long as there is enough electricity. Their beams travel at the speed of light, while microwave weapons can target multiple drones simultaneously.

Yet news military technology always means new teething pains. Just because weapons look good on the drawing board or on a test range doesn’t mean they are ready for battlefield deployment, or they can be manufactured in sufficient quantity to have a major impact.

RAND estimated the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of many directed energy weapons makes them far from being operational. For example, the U.S. Army’s 300-kilowatt truck-mounted laser is only at TRL 4, or the proof of concept stage.

Some projects are further along the curve. RAND rates Israel’s 100-kilowatt Iron Beam laser and U.S. Air Force’s Tactical High-Power Operational Responder (THOR) microwave weapons at TRL 7, or a prototype tested in operational environment. Smaller, less powerful weapons tend to be more advanced: the 50-kilowatt DragonFire, BlueHalo’s 20-kilowatt Locust, and Epirus’s Leonidas HPM are around TRL 8 or 9, which means they are ready to be fielded.

Nonetheless, even the most mature directed energy weapons still face major obstacles before they can become the backbone of anti-drone defense. They guzzle electricity and require extensive cooling, especially lasers. “HELs generate a significant amount of waste heat; lasers are 50 per cent efficient at best and, especially with high-energy capabilities, the excess heat can cause major problems within the weapon itself and the platform it is mounted on if not managed correctly,” said RAND. This infrastructure “can be achieved at land bases and aboard large maritime platforms, but for smaller platforms it is not yet feasible.”

Other disadvantages include a short range, the need for a clear line of sight to the target, and beams that must lock on an agile drone for several seconds. Lasers also function best in clear skies free of rain, snow, fog and clouds, which hardly describes typical winter weather in Ukraine. For Ukraine, which has limited resources, receives fickle foreign aid, and is already facing masses of Russian drones, energy weapons may be a little too cutting-edge.

Nonetheless, investment in energy weapons is worthwhile, even if it’s not suitable for Ukraine right now. For example, Ukraine could modify industrial lasers and other commercial off-the-shelf products to create “an imperfect but good enough Tryzub model at sufficient scale to impact the battlefield,” Kiran Suman-Chauhan, who coauthored the RAND study, told Uncommon Defense. As part of an integrated air defense system that includes missiles and guns, energy weapons could be concentrated at vital points.

And whatever its lack of resources, Ukraine does have creativity and determination in abundance. “The Ukrainian armed forces have already demonstrated remarkable innovation in their approach to C-UAS, utilizing everything from simple shotguns to electronic warfare systems to counter drones on the battlefield,” Suman-Chauhan said.

Lasers and other energy weapons are likely to be the future of anti-drone defense. For Ukraine, the question is when that future will arrive.

China and Russia aren’t sure that the Golden Dome missile system will actually work.

Yet they are not willing to take the risk that it does. Fearing that that an effective U.S. strategic missile defense system could be a prelude to a first strike, Beijing and Moscow may beef up their own nuclear forces, according to an analysis by American experts.

Because of “the perceived political signal Golden Dome is sending and the vagueness surrounding the program, it may influence Chinese and Russian force structure and posture even before the program matures with technical details, and regardless of whether the United States continues the program after Trump,” wrote Raymond Wang and Lachlan MacKenzie for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Wang and MacKenzie analyzed Chinese and Russian reactions to Golden Dome, including government officials, think tanks and media. Those reactions indicate a belief that the Trump administration has gone far beyond the limited missile defense systems of the Obama and Biden administrations, which were designed to stop a small number of ICBMs from nations such as North Korea. Instead, the worry is that the U.S. is seeking comprehensive missile defense of the United States against a full-scale ICBM strike. One Chinese arms control expert claimed that “Golden Dome explicitly targets Russia and China for the first time, indicating a new degree of hostility,” according to CSIS.

Yet despite their apprehension, Chinese and Russian experts question whether Golden Dome would actually work, that the U.S. defense industry is capable of building it, and that the American economy could afford a multi-trillion dollar program. One Chinese journal pointed to a “deficient U.S. industrial base and ongoing difficulties with the Next Generation Interceptor program, speculating that Golden Dome is likely to run into delays and challenges with systems integration,” CSIS noted. “Another Chinese publication predicted that “Golden Dome programs are likely to have cost overruns, which will be difficult given the United States’ debt levels.”

Russian analysts voiced similar sentiments, with one arguing that success depends upon “the United States’ ability to sustain growing its national debt and the MAGA movement’s continued political success, neither of which is guaranteed.”

Moscow is also betting that Putin’s “wonder weapons” will deter an America emboldened by Golden Dome. “Russian analysts argue that Russia’s existing novel nuclear delivery systems—particularly the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon long-range torpedo—ensure that Russia will be able to penetrate any future U.S. defenses,” CSIS wrote.

Skepticism about Golden Dome is hardly confined to America’s adversaries. Many American experts question the effectiveness of a missile defense system that could cost trillions, and is so ambitious that it aims to destroy not just ICBMs, but also cruise and hypersonic missiles.

The current Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system comprises 44 interceptors in Alaska and California, which arguably could stop a handful of ICBMs fired by a rogue nation like North Korea. Golden Dome aims to protect the continental United States from massive nuclear attack, by using a variety of untested technologies, including constellations of space-based interceptors to destroy missiles inside the atmosphere during boost-phase ascent.

Ultimately, the biggest question with Golden Dome isn’t technology, but rather how China and Russia will respond. Both nations fear that America could launch a first strike and then rely on Golden Dome to repel a retaliatory second strike.

Whether this is a rational fear, given Russia’s 5,500 nuclear warheads and China’s growing number of ICBMs, isn’t the point. The obvious countermeasure to an adversary’s missile defense system is to simply build more missiles of your own and overwhelm the defender.

“While experts in Russia and China doubt Golden Dome’s feasibility, it is likely both countries will hedge their bets by developing countermeasures,” MacKenzie told Uncommon Defense. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative was countered by new Soviet missiles and anti-satellite weapons. In 2002, U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – work on a limited missile defense system – spurred Moscow to develop powerful – or zany – weapons such as nuclear-powered cruise missiles and thermonuclear torpedoes that create tidal waves.

“Russian analysts have suggested that similar asymmetric countermeasures, including novel systems and anti-satellite weapons, are the best approach for countering Golden Dome,” according to CSIS.

China’s response is less clear. “Chinese analysts have thus far been quite vague about how China should respond to Golden Dome,” CSIS noted. Some favor pursuing arms control talks, while others want China to increase its nuclear deterrent.

This suggests that China will continue to expand its nuclear forces to guarantee a second-strike capability. “Indeed, China will likely see Golden Dome as a vindication, rather than an effect, of its decision to build up,” CSIS said. Beijing will also “focus on perceived areas of advantage, specifically hypersonics, which Chinese analysts acknowledge pose a challenge to the current U.S. missile defenses. China will also invest in other preexisting systems that help address its concerns with missile defense, such as the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System.”

It’s possible that Trump’s successors will cancel Golden Dome because of cost or feasibility. If the program proceeds, the U.S. will need to balance the desire to protect itself against nuclear attack versus rattling Chinese and Russian fingers on the nuclear trigger.

One way to reassure Beijing and Moscow is to focus Golden Dome on “defending a limited number of high value sites, such as major population centers, key infrastructure and military facilities, against non-strategic weapons, rather than defending the entire homeland against all types of threats,” MacKenzie suggests. “A narrower approach could also eliminate the need for space-based interceptors, which Moscow and Beijing have singled out as particularly destabilizing.”

On the other hand, even if Golden Dome were scrapped or downsized, this still might not reassure China and Russia that America isn’t seeking nuclear hegemony. The missile defense genie can’t be put back inside the bottle.

If China invades Taiwan, it may be with infantry with only minimal support from tanks.

Chinese strategists believe infantry is better suited for fighting in Taiwan’s mountainous and urban terrain, according to an analysis by Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia Program at the Defense Priorities think tank in Washington, D.C. Perhaps more important, infantry and light vehicles could be transported by China’s vast fleet of civilian ships, rather than needing special landing craft to carry armored vehicles.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes it can “establish beachheads without heavy armor in the initial invasion wave,” Goldstein wrote. “This would allow them to heavily employ civilian craft that cannot carry heavy vehicles ashore.”

If this analysis is correct, than a Chinese invasion becomes far more feasible. To successfully invade Taiwan, China must grapple with a traditional problem of amphibious warfare: infantry storming a beach only have the firepower they can carry on their backs, while the defender enjoys the advantages of terrain, fortification and heavy weapons. Since World War II, one solution has been to land tanks and other armored vehicles that either swim ashore under their own power, or are transported by specialized landing craft. Indeed, a shortage of Landing Ship Tanks (LST) constrained Allied amphibious operations throughout World War II.

However, Goldstein argues that masses of Chinese light infantry – backed by heavy firepower from missiles, aircraft, drones and artillery as well as paratroopers and helicopters – could successfully land on Taiwan without the need for tanks. “My view is that tanks are nice to have but not really essential,” Goldstein told Uncommon Defense. “They are quite vulnerable to Javelin [anti-tank missile]-type weapons as well as kamikaze drones, and the Chinese are well aware of this. I think tanks would be involved, but light infantry would bear the brunt of the attack in small fast craft.”

In Goldstein’s timeline for a hypothetical Chinese invasion, the invasion would begin with a massive bombardment of Taiwan. “Within a few hours, 20,000 to 30,000 heliborne and airborne troops are on the ground, creating chaos and taking over key locations such as airfields and small ports,” he said. “Chinese mobilization begins in earnest at that point and the first landings take place 24 to 48 hours later, so maybe T + 2 days. Lodgments are solidified during T + 4 to 6, and then breakouts are initiated the following week. Nearly complete conquest takes 8 to 10 weeks.”

Key to this plan would be ensuring adequate sealift. China has a dozen or so major amphibious assault vessels – including the new 40,000-ton Type 076 class – plus numerous smaller naval landing craft. They would be joined by the China Coast Guard with around 500 ships, plus hundreds more vessels from the paramilitary People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia. This force would be supplemented by China’s huge commercial fleet, including more than 5,000 merchant ships, as well as dozens of RO-RO (roll-on roll-off) ferries that can carry tanks.

But what would truly enable an infantry-centric invasion would be China’s 400,000 fishing boats. While they’re too small to carry vehicles, Goldstein believes they haul 500,000 troops to Taiwan over the course of a two-month campaign.

“Tens of thousands of fishing vessels would be too numerous to target with standard anti-ship weapons and could thus likely overwhelm Taiwan defenses,” Goldstein wrote.

Such a strategy carries its own risks. “The downside for China is that small boat captains, despite being in a ‘maritime militia,’ are not active military personnel trained for combat and have never rehearsed an operation on this scale, making it a serious risk for the PLA to undertake,” wrote Goldstein. “And the greater vulnerability of small boats would make for heavy losses if they come under heavy fire from Taiwanese forces that have not been adequately suppressed by air cover and other methods of shore bombardment.”

Nor would China turn back the clock to pre-mechanized warfare. Special armored vehicles would accompany the initial assault waves to clear beach mines and obstacles. Follow-up waves would bring in tanks and armored troop carriers, a task made easier if the invaders can capture any ports. But rather than an armored blitzkrieg, PLA attacks would be made by infantry backed by intensive firepower, with tanks relegated to supported the foot soldiers.

But this approach does maximize China’s strengths: a regular military of 2 million personnel, plus reserves, paramilitary police and a huge pool of draft-age manpower. And, an arsenal of thousands of ballistic and other types of missiles, 3,000 combat aircraft, and a multitude of drones. Taiwan has 169,000 active-duty personnel and around 400 combat aircraft.

“The PLA is training hard for both urban warfare and also rough terrain,” said Goldstein. “They will bring some new and innovative tech to this battlefield such as micro-drones, as well as lessons from the urban, trench and bunker warfare in Ukraine.”

“But they also understand that this fight is largely about firepower and morale. They know they are likely to take very high casualties. Medical drills also show increased realism and intensity. By contrast, it is generally acknowledged by experts on Taiwan’s military that the ground forces are the weakest and most neglected of the services.”

Taiwanese coastal defenses could sink some Chinese landing craft, “but not nearly enough to stop the invasion,” said Goldstein. A defense-in-depth inland could prolong the campaign, but Goldstein said he is “skeptical that Taiwan can hold either on the beaches or inland, even with U.S. and allied help.”

Either way, an invasion armada of Chinese fishing boats evokes images of the Battle of Dunkirk, when a ragtag British flotilla evacuated 338,000 British and French soldiers. However, “Dunkirk was very spontaneous, disorganized, and rather lucky,” Goldstein said. “This would be similar in that it would feature lots of civilian craft, but different in that I expect it would be rather orderly. I think the Chinese have proven themselves to be quite good at both big jobs and at meticulous planning and training.”