Your argument does not address the strategic mobility needed to even place mechanized formations in contact with each other. The U.S. has that capability in far greater quantities than the PLA. Any attempt by the PLA to move mechanized forces off of mainland China toward Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, etc. would carry enormous risk.
Taiwan and the Philippines already have sufficient obstacles and mechanized forces to repel PLA armor that would likely arrive at a beachhead, and the U.S. already has sufficient anti-armor forces in place to defend its own territories and bases on the island chains.
The scenarios presented in this article are far more likely to occur on the Korean peninsula than anywhere else. In a Korean scenario, the terrain is constricting enough to render a mechanized formation highly vulnerable to obstacles, strike aircraft, drones, and artillery.
I think the U.S. Army analysis was aimed at demonstrating how the Chinese Army plans to fight the U.S. Army. I agree the scenario isn't that likely -- it sounds more like a NATO-Soviet battle in the Fulda Gap -- but it does show that China thinks it can defeat America in a combined-arms ground battle.
Agreed that big-unit battles are more likely in Korea. The question is to what extent North Korea will modify its tactics in light of the lessons of the Ukraine War, especially regarding drones.
From what I remember from our own doctrine and war games. The Chinese BDE and its fellow BDEs would be combat ineffective long before US BDEs entered the theater. So there is that..,
It's mirror-imaging. The U.S. wants to render Chinese ground forces ineffective before the battle begins. China wants to render American troops ineffective before the battle.
What's interesting is both nations plan to use many of the same techniques, especially by attacking enemy command and control.
Today's U.S. Army hasn't changed that much since the Korean War. It still relies on armored vehicles, radio communications, and lots of support from the Air Force. Today's People's Liberation Army looks nothing like the Chinese peasant foot soldiers from the Korean War.
Drivel ... guess what either Army will look like in another generation. They'll BOTH rely on "armored vehicles, radio communications, and lots of support from the Air Force".
The difference is that China's PLAN will still be staffed by peasants equipped with knock-off designs from the west.
The issue is that such a battle plan seems to ignore geography. Specifically, where would that battlefield be fought? Taiwan? The PLA would have to bring massive resources into the region; I doubt that we would allow that to happen. Korea? Again, hardly. And as far as I know, we have no plans to invade China anytime soon—I hope.
Don't look at this as a prediction of a future China vs U.S. battle. It's more an analysis of how China plans to fight a land battle against the U.S., given what China perceives as American weaknesses.
A replay of the Battle of Kursk in Taiwan or Korea doesn't seem likely. But a brigade-level clash (say, about 5,000 men and a couple of hundred armored vehicles on each side) is not impossible.
Fair enough but you’re ignoring airpower. Our land forces are not going into battle without massive air support—I think that we have the upper hand in that respect. And this is what we did in the Gulf War.
China believes that its air force and air defenses can neutralize American airpower. Fighting in the Strait of Taiwan -- in China's backyard -- that assumption may be partly correct.
At the least, the U.S. Army probably would not enjoy the level of air support it had in WWII or Desert Storm. The U.S. Air Force will be busy with a lot of other missions.
Your argument does not address the strategic mobility needed to even place mechanized formations in contact with each other. The U.S. has that capability in far greater quantities than the PLA. Any attempt by the PLA to move mechanized forces off of mainland China toward Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, etc. would carry enormous risk.
Taiwan and the Philippines already have sufficient obstacles and mechanized forces to repel PLA armor that would likely arrive at a beachhead, and the U.S. already has sufficient anti-armor forces in place to defend its own territories and bases on the island chains.
The scenarios presented in this article are far more likely to occur on the Korean peninsula than anywhere else. In a Korean scenario, the terrain is constricting enough to render a mechanized formation highly vulnerable to obstacles, strike aircraft, drones, and artillery.
I think the U.S. Army analysis was aimed at demonstrating how the Chinese Army plans to fight the U.S. Army. I agree the scenario isn't that likely -- it sounds more like a NATO-Soviet battle in the Fulda Gap -- but it does show that China thinks it can defeat America in a combined-arms ground battle.
Agreed that big-unit battles are more likely in Korea. The question is to what extent North Korea will modify its tactics in light of the lessons of the Ukraine War, especially regarding drones.
I may explore that Korean scenario next time.
From what I remember from our own doctrine and war games. The Chinese BDE and its fellow BDEs would be combat ineffective long before US BDEs entered the theater. So there is that..,
It's mirror-imaging. The U.S. wants to render Chinese ground forces ineffective before the battle begins. China wants to render American troops ineffective before the battle.
What's interesting is both nations plan to use many of the same techniques, especially by attacking enemy command and control.
Riiiiight ... and the US Army has remained static since the Korean War, hasn't it.
Today's U.S. Army hasn't changed that much since the Korean War. It still relies on armored vehicles, radio communications, and lots of support from the Air Force. Today's People's Liberation Army looks nothing like the Chinese peasant foot soldiers from the Korean War.
Drivel ... guess what either Army will look like in another generation. They'll BOTH rely on "armored vehicles, radio communications, and lots of support from the Air Force".
The difference is that China's PLAN will still be staffed by peasants equipped with knock-off designs from the west.
Be serious
Can you be more specific?
The issue is that such a battle plan seems to ignore geography. Specifically, where would that battlefield be fought? Taiwan? The PLA would have to bring massive resources into the region; I doubt that we would allow that to happen. Korea? Again, hardly. And as far as I know, we have no plans to invade China anytime soon—I hope.
Don't look at this as a prediction of a future China vs U.S. battle. It's more an analysis of how China plans to fight a land battle against the U.S., given what China perceives as American weaknesses.
A replay of the Battle of Kursk in Taiwan or Korea doesn't seem likely. But a brigade-level clash (say, about 5,000 men and a couple of hundred armored vehicles on each side) is not impossible.
Fair enough but you’re ignoring airpower. Our land forces are not going into battle without massive air support—I think that we have the upper hand in that respect. And this is what we did in the Gulf War.
China believes that its air force and air defenses can neutralize American airpower. Fighting in the Strait of Taiwan -- in China's backyard -- that assumption may be partly correct.
At the least, the U.S. Army probably would not enjoy the level of air support it had in WWII or Desert Storm. The U.S. Air Force will be busy with a lot of other missions.
And here’s an interesting article on the subject writ large
https://understandingwar.org/research/uncategorized/applying-us-air-warfare-theory-and-doctrine-to-evaluate-the-campaign-against-iran-part-1/?utm_source=utm_constantcontact&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=USAirWarfareDoctrine
The reality is that China could walk into Taiwan tomorrow and the US would do nothing as their leadeship does not exist.